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Public Entities, Officers and Employees
Expedited Judicial Review Ensures that Restraints on the
Adult Entertainment Industry Pass Constitutional Muster
Sandra C. Di Giulio
Code Section Affected
Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.8 (new).
SB 1165 (Sher); 1999 STAT. Ch. 49 (Effective July 1, 1999)
I. INTRODUCTION
Business licensing is a power used by California cities and counties to regulate
the types of business transacted within their jurisdictions.! Often, local legislative
bodies use this power to regulate by ordinance adult and sexually oriented
businesses, doing so in fear of the effects these businesses may have on their
surroundings.2 California's local legislative bodies have broad power to control the
issuance of permits and licenses for adult businesses.3 However, many of these
sexually oriented businesses, which are regulated through licensing schemes
properly analyzed as prior restraints,4 engage in constitutionally protected free
speech.
Many forms of expression, such as speech and entertainment, are protected by5
the First Amendment. Examples include film, radio and television broadcasts and
live entertainment.6 Courts have found many businesses, such as bookstores, live
theaters, motion picture theaters and nude dancing establishments, which "purvey
1. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16000(a) (West 1997) (granting any incorporated city the authority to
license any kind of business within its jurisdiction for the purpose of regulating businesses); id. § 16100(a)
(extending to any county board of directors the authority to license any kind of business within its jurisdiction for
the purpose of regulating businesses).
2. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65850(g)(I)-(3) (West 1997) (conferring upon city and county legislative
bodies the power to regulate by ordinance the time, place and manner of operation of sexually oriented
businesses); id. § 65850.4 (West Supp. 1999) (authorizing city and county legislative bodies to join powers to
regulate the established negative effects of sexually oriented businesses as well as to consider any harmful effects
such businesses may have on nearby cities, counties, churches, schools, residents and businesses).
3. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16000(a) (West 1997) (affording to the legislative body of any
incorporated city the authority to utilize its police power to regulate by licensing); id. § 16100(a) (affording to the
legislative body of any incorporated county the authority to employ its police power to regulate by licensing).
4. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (explaining that "a prior restraint exists when
enjoyment of protected expression is contingent upon the approval of government officials").
5. Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
6. Id.
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sexually explicit speech" to be protected by the First Amendment? The U.S.
Supreme Court has acknowledged that nudity alone does not automatically
constitute obscenity,8 which is not protected by the First Amendment. 9
Since 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court has required that any process having the
effect of restricting protected expression take place under specific procedural
safeguards that work to avert the dangers of a censorship system."0 A recent Ninth
Circuit case gave clear meaning to one of the safeguards promulgated in the 1965
Freedman v. Maryland decision." The Ninth Circuit, in Baby Tam & Co. v. City of
Las Vegas,12 held that in the context of adult business licensing schemes, "prompt
judicial review" encompasses both a hearing and a decision on the merits by a
judicial officer.1 3 Furthermore, the court held that a provision for mandamus relief
does not satisfy the required procedural safeguard of "prompt judicial review."14
This case prompted the introduction and passage of Chapter 49.1S The new law
was created after the Baby Tam case wrapped cities and counties in a catch-22,
threatening to lead to judicial invalidation of their licensing regulations.16 Baby Tam
reaffirmed that local governments could impose no licensing ordinance that did not
provide for a prompt hearing and decision upon challenge. 7 However, prior to
Chapter 49, cities and counties could not ensure prompt review because local
governments do not have power to govern the speed of judicial review.' 8 Chapter
49 addresses this problem by setting a time line which provides for expedited
judicial review of license denials upon challenge.
7. See FW/PBS, Inc., v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 224 (1990) (giving examples of cases involving
various adult businesses "purveying sexually explicit speech" and which are protected by the First Amendment
in so doing).
8. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (holding that in order to be classified by law as
obscene, the material, taken as a whole, must appeal to the "prurient interest" in sex, depict sexual acts in a
patently offensive way, and hold no serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value).
9. Id. at 23.
10. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (holding that in order for a censorship proceeding
to avoid constitutional inadequacy, it must contain three procedural safeguards to protect against the dangers of
censorship: (1) the procedure must assure a prompt judicial decision in the event a license is denied; (2) any
restraint imposed prior to final judicial determination must be limited to preservation of the status quo for the
shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution; and (3) the censor must bear the burden of going
to court and proving that the expression is unprotected).
11. 380 U.S. 697 (1965); see also Baby Tam & Co. v. City of Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that "prompt judicial review" means a hearing and a decision by a judicial officer, and holding
that a writ of mandamus does not qualify as "prompt judicial review").
12. 154 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 1998).
13. Jd.at I101.
14. I
15. See ASSEMBLY COMMrrEE ONJUDICIARY, COMMIT rEANALYSIS OFSB 1165, at 3-4 (June 8, 1999)
(noting the Baby Tam decision, and stating the necessity of Chapter 49 in order to ensure that California has a
mechanism for sufficiently expeditious judicial review of license denials and revocations).
16. ASEMBLY COMMrr E ON JDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS oFSB 1165, at 4 (June 8, 1999).
17. See Baby Tam, 154 F.3d at 1101 (stating that "[a] licensing scheme involving a prior restraint must also
provide an avenue for prompt judicial review in the event a license is denied").
18. Ua
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Since 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court has been developing guidelines for the
censorship and suppression of speech and expression.19 The Court has specifically
addressed the issue of licensing schemes for sexually oriented businesses20 and has
concluded that certain protections must be built into the ordinances.21 Recently, the
Ninth Circuit defined one of the protections mandated by the Supreme Court in a
way that invalidated certain licensing schemes and threatened to undermine city and
state power to regulate the adult entertainment industry.2"
A. License Denials, Prior Restraints, and the First Amendment
1. United States Supreme Court Decisions
The U.S. Supreme Court has defined the proper safeguards for licensing
schemes involving prior restraints on protected speech. In Freedman,23 the Court
established a set of procedural safeguards that are triggered by prior restraints on
protected speech or expression. 24 The Court stated that "any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against
its constitutional validity."z The Court reasoned that censorship proceedings pose
a specific danger that the censor will be less protective of constitutionally protected
interests in free expression than a court would be.26 The Court held that in order to
safeguard against the dangers of censorship, a prior restraint on protected
expression must contain three procedural safeguards: (1) prompt and final judicial
determination on the merits in the event a license is denied; (2) any restraint must
be limited to the shortest period of time compatible with judicial resolution so as
to preserve the status quo; and (3) the censor must bear the burden of proving that
the material is unprotected expression.27
19. Freedman, supra note 10; see'also discussion infra Part H.A.1 (reviewing the cases which established
and modified the guidelines for restraints on expression).
20. FW/PB, Inc., 439 U.S. at 220.
21. See i& at 228 (concluding that two procedural safeguards are required: the decision of whether or not
to grant the license must be made within a set and reasonable time, and there must be an avenue for prompt
judicial review in the event of an erroneous denial); see also discussion infra PartH.A.1 (discussing FW/PBS, Inc.,
v. City of Dallas, 439 U.S. 215 (1990)).
22. See supra note 12; see also discussion infra Part H.A.2-B (examining the definition given by the court
in Baby Tam as well as the impact of that decision).
23. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
24. Id. at 58-59.
25. Id. at 57 (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
26. Id. at 56-57.
27. a at 58-59.
625
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The next major U.S. Supreme Court case to revisit the issue of procedural
safeguards for prior restraints on protected expression was FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of
Dallas.28 The petitioners therein raised a facial challenge to a city ordinance which
provided a licensing scheme for the adult entertainment industry.29 The Court noted
that a licensing scheme is similar to a censorship system in that both create the
possibility that protected expression will be suppressed in the absence of adequate
procedural safeguards.30 The plurality opinion in FWIPBS reaffirmed two parts of
the Freedman test in holding that a city or county must make a licensing decision
relatively quickly and within a specific time frame during which the status quo must
be preserved, and that a licensing scheme must afford prompt judicial review to
minimize the risk of suppression of protected speech in the event that a city or
county improperly denies a license. 3' However, the plurality found that the First
Amendment does not require a city to bear the burden of proving the validity of a
license denial in court.32 The status of the third safeguard-that the censor meet its
burden of proof regarding the expression's unprotected stature-is unclear today,
as FIWIPBS was a plurality opinion and thus did not expressly overrule Freedman.33
2. The Law in the Ninth Circuit
Disagreement exists among the circuits as to what constitutes "prompt judicial
review." 34 In 1998, the Ninth Circuit, in a case similar to FWIPBS, announced its
interpretation of the meaning of the "prompt judicial review" safeguard.35 In Baby
Tam & Co. v. City of Las Vegas, an adult bookstore challenged a Las Vegas
ordinance which required that all proposed businesses receive a license before
operating.36 The plaintiff claimed that the ordinance was an unconstitutional prior
restraint of free speech and expression. 7 The ordinance provided that in the event
the city denied a license, the applicant could file a petition for a writ of mandamus
in Nevada state court.38 The Ninth Circuit determined that a writ of mandamus did
28. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
29. lad at 223.
30. IL at 226.
31. Mafat228.
32. Id. at 230.
33. See Baby Tam & Co. v. City of Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that
because only three justices joined the portion of the opinion which dispensed of the safeguard requiring the
licensor to bear the burden of justifying a license denial in court, the current status of this safeguard is
questionable).
34. .
35. See id at 1101 (recognizing that the meaning of "prompt judicial review" in the context of adult
business licensing schemes has been the subject of disagreement among the circuits, and announcing its own
definition, stating that "prompt judicial review" includes both a prompt hearing and a decision).
36. Id. at 1099-1100.
37. Id at i100.
38. Id. at 1101.
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not satisfy the required procedural safeguard of prompt judicial review, in that the
ordinance also lacked a provision requiring that a judicial hearing be held or a
decision returned within a prescribed time period.39 The Baby Tam court held that
the proper standard included both a prompt consideration of a dispute by a judicial
officer and a prompt decision.' ° The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would
be to render the safeguard meaningless.4'
The purpose of a writ of mandate is (1) to command the performance of an act
that the law enjoins, or (2) to command the admission of a party to the enjoyment
of a right to which that party is entitled, but has been unlawfully precluded from
enjoying.42 Because a traditional writ of mandate cannot compel a court to consider
and decide a matter within a prescribed period of time while the applicant's rights
are being stifled, the court held that it does not satisfy the requirement of prompt
judicial review;43 therefore, the ordinance constituted a prior restraint in violation
of the First Amendment. 4 The Ninth Circuit never reached the issue concerning the
Freedman requirement that the censor bear the burden of justifying the restraint in
court.
45
B. Judicial Review of License Denials in California
On December 2, 1998, Cheerleaders, a Citrus Heights, California, adult bar,
filed an action and moved for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the city
from enforcing an ordinance that restricted adult-oriented businesses from operating
without first obtaining a license from the city.' The plaintiff asserted that the
ordinance's licensing scheme constituted a prior restraint on protected speech, and
"fail[ed] to provide for a prompt judicial decision as is required." 47 A prior restraint
exists when exercise of protected expression is made dependent upon approval by
government officials." The defendants acknowledged that the ordinance failed to
provide a quick hearing and decision by a judicial officer.49 Consequently, in light
of the Baby Tam decision, the judge found that the plaintiff had shown the requisite
39. ld.
40. Il
41. Id
42. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1085(a) (West Supp. 2000).
43. Baby Tam & Co. v. CityofLasVegas, 154F.3d 1097,1101 (9thCir. 1998).
44. Id. at 1102.
45. Id. at 1101.
46. Le v. City of Citrus Heights, No. Civ. S-98-2305 WBS/DAD, 1998 WL 1069451, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec.
15, 1998) [hereinafter Le 1].
47. Il at*3.
48. Baby Tam & Co. v. City of Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 1998).
49. Le 1, 1998 WL 1069451, at *3.
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probability of success on the merits of its claim,50 and, accordingly granted the
preliminary injunction."
In an effort to address the city ordinance's failure to provide both a prompt
hearing and a decision by a judicial officer in the event of a license's denial, Citrus
Heights passed several revised urgency ordinances. 52 Cheerleaders challenged the
ordinances in court on two subsequent occasions. a Both times, the court found that
the plaintiff had shown a probability of success on the merits, and enjoined the city
from enforcing portions of the ordinances in question. The court concluded that
Citrus Heights continued to lack adequate procedural safeguards assuring prompt
judicial determination on the merits in the event of a license denial. 54 The court
further indicated that establishing the necessary procedural safeguards may be "an
impossible burden on the [c]ity," because the city has no authority to require a
judicial officer to render a decision by a certain date-although the California
Legislature may have such power.55 The court also expressed substantial doubts
regarding whether a trial judge faced with today's significant caseloads can give
enough priority to such matters to satisfy the stringent standard required by the First
Amendment after the Baby Tam case.56
Existing California law requires that upon denial of an application for a license,
an administrative board57 must either file and serve a statement of issues,5 8 or notify
the applicant that their business license application has been denied.59 If the board
chooses the latter, the board must state the reason why the license was denied, and
inform the applicant that she has the right to a hearing on the matter if she makes
such a request within sixty days after service of the notice of denial.60 If the
applicant desires a hearing, she must request it within the sixty days or her right is
50. Id.
51. Id. at *4.
52. See Lev. City of Citrus Heights, No. Civ. S-98-2305 WBSIDAD, 1999 WL 420153, at *2 (E.D. Cal.
Feb. 11, 1999) [hereinafter Le 11] (declaring that the city has thirty days to approve or deny the application; if
denied, the applicant may seek prompt judicial review as provided by law or request that the city file the action,
and, when the city is the one bringing the action, they must do so within three business days of the request); Mai
Lee Le v. City of Citrus Heights, No. Civ. S-98-2305 WBS/DAD, 1999 WL 420158, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June15,
1999) [hereinafter Le 111] (allowing an applicant who has been denied a license to be issued a temporary license
which shall remain in effect until a decision on an application for a temporary restraining order or for a
preliminary injunction)
53. See Ie II, 1999 WL 420153, at *1 (challenging two new urgency ordinances passed by the city
immediately following the first case); Le 11, 1999 WL 420158, at *1-2 (challenging yet another pair of urgency
ordinances which were passed by the city hours after the second case).
54. Le 11, 1999 WL 420153, at *7; Le III, 1999 WL 420158, at *5.
55. Le II, 1999 WL 420153, at *8.
56. LeII1, 1999 WL420158, at *5.
57. See C.AL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22 (West Supp. 2000) (defining a board as the body in which the
administration of a certain provision is vested).
58. See Id. § 485(a) (West Supp. 1999) (explaining that a statement is to be filed and served in accordance
with a subpart of Title 2 of the Government Code).
59. Ud § 485(b) (West Supp. 2000).
60. Id § 485(b) (West Supp. 2000).
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deemed waived.61 An applicant who submits a written request is entitled to a board
hearing within ninety days of the request.62 However, the hearing could be
postponed for between 45 and 180 additional days.63 If an applicant loses the
hearing and wishes to appeal the denial through the judicial system, a writ of
mandate is the appropriate method of appeal."
After the Baby Tam decision, cities and counties faced a catch-22; they could
not regulate adult-oriented businesses without providing a speedy judicial decision
upon challenge, yet they had no way of compelling local courts to render swift
decisions in such challenges.65 The city of San Jose, concerned that it would be
unable to regulate adult-oriented businesses for lack of power to compel local
courts to review permit denials in an expedited manner, sponsored Chapter 49 with
support from Citrus Heights and other localities.6
]I. CHAPTER 49
In response to the potential inability of local governments to apply licensing
schemes to adult-oriented businesses after the Baby Tam decision, the California
Legislature passed Chapter 49.67 The purpose of Chapter 49 is to create an
expedited judicial review process to appeal a local administrative revocation,
suspension or denial of a permit or other entitlement for expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.68 The new law
creates a time line for expedited judicial review within which a writ petition must
proceed once filed. 9 California cities may now regulate adult-oriented businesses
in accordance with the Constitution and the Baby Tam decision.
Under Chapter 49, either the public agency or the permit applicant may bring
an action. ° If the applicant brings such an action, it must be in the form of a
petition for a writ of mandate.71 The applicant must file and serve the petition on the
agency within twenty-one calendar days of the final decision on the permit.72 After
61. Id § 485(b) (West Supp. 2000).
62. id § 487 (West 1990).
63. See id (stating that upon a showing of good cause or an order by the Office of Administrative Hearings,
two additional requests of up to 45 days each may be made, except in cases involving fraud, in which case the
hearing may be delayed up to 180 days).
64. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(a) (West Supp. 2000) (explaining that a court may issue a writ to
determine the soundness of a final administrative order).
65. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMmrrTEEANALYSiSOFSB 1165, at 3 (June 11, 1999).
66. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrrTEEANALYSIS OFSB 1165, at 2 (June 11, 1999).
67. See AsSEMBLYFLOOR,COMMrrTEEANALYSISOFSB 1165, at3 (June 11, 1999) (stressing the need for
the bill to ensure that city and county regulations of adult-oriented businesses do not become invalidated by the
Baby Tam decision).
68. ASSEMBLY COMMrEnm ON JtDICIARY, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1165, at 1 (June 8, 1999).
69. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1094.8(d)(1)-(5) (enacted by Chapter 49).
70. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.8(d)(2) (enacted by Chapter 49).
71. Id. (enacted by Chapter 49).
72. Id. § 1094.8(d)(3) (enacted by Chapter 49).
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being notified that the permit applicant wishes to seek a judicial review of the
decision on the permit, the public agency has five court days to prepare, certify and
make available the administrative record of the permit application proceeding.73
The petitioner/applicant must file the administrative record with the court no later
than ten calendar days before the hearing date.74
The title page of the petition is to contain language calling the court's attention
to the fact that the petition is entitled to priority and an expedited hearing pursuant
to section 1094.8 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.75 The clerk of the court
must then set a hearing for review of the petition within twenty-five calendar days
of the date of the petition's filing.76 After the hearing, the court must render its
decision no later than twenty calendar days after the matter's submission, or fifty
calendar days after the date of the petition's filing, whichever is earlier.77
If for some reason the court cannot meet one or more of the deadlines imposed
by the time line, Chapter 49 requires that the presiding judge assign a judicial
officer to hear the petition and render a decision in accordance with the time line.78
If the parties to the action prefer to have a judge preside over the action, they may
jointly waive the time limits mandated by Chapter 49.79
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LAW
The purpose of Chapter 49 is to create an expedited writ of mandate proceeding
in order to review the decision of a public agency denying a permit to a business
that engages in expressive conduct8 Chapter 49 allows cities that use licensing
schemes to regulate adult entertainment businesses to do so in accordance with the
constitutionally mandated judicial review requirement of both a hearing and a
decision.8t
According to the California Business and Professions Code, an applicant who
has been denied a permit has sixty days to submit an application for a hearing. 82
However, the applicable Freedman safeguard states that any restraint imposed prior
to final judicial determination must be limited to the shortest fixed period
compatible with judicial determination.8 3 Chapter 49 cuts the time to twenty-one
7-3. Id. § 1094.8(dX1) (enacted by Chapter 49).
74. Id. § 1094.8(d)(4) (enacted by Chapter 49)
75. Id. § 1094.8(d)(3) (enacted by Chapter 49).
76. Id. § 1094.8(d)(4) (enacted by Chapter 49).
77. Id. § 1094.8(d)(5) (enacted by Chapter 49).
78. Id. § 1094.8(e) (enacted by Chapter 49).
79. Id. § 1094.8() (enacted by Chapter 49).
80. ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEEONJuDICIAitY, COMM=rEE ANALYSIS oFSB 1165, at 1 (June 8, 1999).
81. See ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1165, at 3-4 (June 8, 1999)
(explaining the holding in the Baby Tam and staing that SB 1165 [Chapter 49] seeks to guarantce that California
has a sufficiently quick mechanism for judicial review of license denials and revocations).
82. CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CODE § 485(b) (West Supp. 1999).
83. See supra note 10 (listing the procedural safeguards mandated by Freedman).
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 31
days from the date of the agency's final decision on the permit." The text of
Chapter 49 declares that its provisions "shall supersede anything to the contrary set
forth in this chapter." Prior to Chapter 49, no schedule existed by which a writ
needed to proceed once filed. The applicable Freedman safeguard is that the
licensing procedure must assure prompt judicial review,86 which was defined in
Baby Tam as requiring both a review and determination on the merits.87 Chapter 49
sets a rigid time line which the court must follow. 88 If the time line is followed,
every challenge would be decided in around seven weeks. This should be
sufficiently expeditious for licensing schemes to survive constitutional scrutiny.
Chapter 49 provides a workable solution to a difficult requirement imposed
upon cities and administrative boards within the Ninth Circuit after Baby Tam.
Although this bill was enacted in response to problems and concerns with
regulation of the adult entertainment industry, the fact is, Chapter 49 applies to all
licensing and permitting actions that involve expressive conduct such as special
event permits, park permits, sign regulations, and other analogous regulations.8 9 It
extends beyond the adult entertainment world and provides expedited review for all
permitting actions that involve protected expression.'
This extra protection is good for erroneous suppression of protected speech,
however, the number of writs brought under this new section may overwhelm
courts. In addition, Chapter 49 may be too broad because it gives unnecessary
expedited review in cases where the administrative board has revoked or suspended
an existing license. 9' It is unnecessary because ever since the Freedman case, the
court held that reviewing agencies may not alter the status quo prior to judicial
review of their actions; thus, the agency wouldn't be able to immediately enforce
a revocation or suspension pending judicial determination.92 This reality carries the
possibility that the number of cases that may be brought to the courts under this new
law may overwhelm the courts and their judicial officers.93
84. CAL. Civ. PROc. CODE § 1094.8(d)(3) (enacted by Chapter 49).
85. Id. § 1094.8(d) (enacted by Chapter 49).
86. See supra note 10 (listing the procedural safeguards mandated by Freedman).
87. See supra note 12 (explaining the holding of the case as defining "prompt judicial review" to entail
both review and a decision).
88. See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text (explaining the time line set by Chapter 49).
89. See ASSEMBLY CoMMrrrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1165, at 4 (June 8, 1999)
(noting the wide scope of the Baby Tam decision).
90. ASSEMBLY COMMIMrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1165, at 4 (June 8, 1999).
91. ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMM=ITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1165, at 5-6 (June 8, 1999).
92. ASSEMBLY COMMrrrEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMTFEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1165, at 5-6 (June 8, 1999).
93. See id. at 5 (arguing in opposition to the bill that expedient review will place a heavy burden on the
courts). But see Ud at 6 (observing that, although the Judicial Council took no position regarding Chapter 49, it
helped to draft the bill and a representative of the Judicial Council indicated that "increased costs to trial courts
[resulting from the bill] are expected to be minimal").
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V. CONCLUSION
In view of the Baby Tam decision, Chapter 49 sends local governments on their
way to creating licensing schemes involving prior restraints on protected expression
in accordance with "prompt judicial review."94 Given the strict interpretation this
phrase has been given by the Ninth Circuit, Chapter 49's passage was a logical
reaction to the Baby Tam decision, although the new law may grant too much
protection because it applies to all licensing and permitting actions that involve
expressive conduct. 5 Though its constitutionality is untested and its effects have
yet to be seen, Chapter 49 will likely result in cities and counties being capable of
regulating adult-oriented businesses while conforming with constitutional law.
As for Cheerleaders, the Citrus Heights topless bar, the bar's owners are closing
their doors and leaving the city.9 Unable to pay for the costs of the legal battle any
more, Cheerleaders' owners have settled with Citrus Heights and dropped their
lawsuitY The bar owners will be paid a sum of money by the city, and in return
they will close the bar and never return.98
94. See supra Part III (specifying the specific provisions that Chapter 49 adds in order to meet the stringent
standard sat by Baby Tam).
95. See supra Part IV (pointing out that the new law will also apply to special event permits, park permits,
sign regulations, and other analogous regulations).
96. Denny Walsh, Topless Bar Will Leave Citrus Heights, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 4, 2000, at B4.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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Regulation of Permanent Amusement Park Rides
David D. Krenzenetsky
Code Sections Affected
Labor Code §§ 7920, 7921, 7922, 7923, 7924, 7925, 7926, 7927, 7928,
7929, 7030,7931,7932 (new).
AB 850 (Torlakson); 1999 STAT. Ch. 585
I. INTRODUCTON
Are serious injuries and deaths from accidents at California's amusement parks
needless tragedies, or merely the cost of doing business? The California Legislature
revisited that question in the wake of recent highly publicized incidents.'
Disneyland was the scene of an accident which ignited this year's debate on the
issue.2 A nine-pound metal cleat which tore loose from the Columbia Sailing Ship
ride flew into a crowd of tourists, striking and killing one man. His wife and a
Disneyland employee were also seriously injured.4 A probe into the accident
launched by the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal-OSHA)
revealed that repeated misuse of equipment and failure to train a key employee were
the reasons for the mishap.5 As a result, Cal-OSHA fined Disneyland $12,500.6
An increase in the number of amusement park ride accidents is a national
problem.7 The rate of emergency room visits resulting from amusement park
1. See Nancy Hill.Holtzman, SafetyBi MayDefertoDisney on InspectinsLegislationL.A.T mEs, Feb.
23, 1999, at BI (revealing that since 1968, six bills were introduced in the California Legislature to regulate
permanent amusement park rides, and that all six bills failed to pass); see also CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 7920-7932
(enacted by Chapter 585) (establishing the Permanent Amusement Ride Safety Program in California).
2. See Deborah Schoch & Tracy Weber, Amusement Park Safety Bill Gains New Life, L.A TIMES, Dec.
29, 1998, at B I (explaining that hopes for amusement park legislation in 1999 were revived by a fatal Christmas
Eve accident at Disneyland).
3. Nancy Weaver Teichert, Calls for Oversight of Rides Intensify, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 19, 1999, at
Al; see also Nancy Hill-Holtzman, supra note 1, at BI (describing the December 1998 accident at Disneyland);
Schoch & Weber, supra note 2, at BI (recounting the story of how 33-year-old Luan Phi Dawson, of Duvall,
Washington died of head injuries at Disneyland).
4. Schoch &Weber, supra note 2, at B1; see also id (reporting that Mr. Dawson's wife Lieu Thuy Voung,
and Disneyland employee Christine Carpenter, were also struck by the cleat and suffered serious injuries; Mrs.
Voung was taken to intensive care and Ms. Carpenter was hospitalized with a severe foot injury).
5. Teichert, supra note 3, at Al.
6. Id.
7. See Theme Park Ride Injuries Rise 87% over Five Years, L.A. TMES, Sept. 21, 1999, at B8 (stating
that across the nation, serious injuries at amusement parks resulting in emergency treatment increased from "2,400
in 1994 to 4,500 in 1998').
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injuries across the nation has risen by an estimated eighty-seven percent over the
past five years.8 Much of the increase is due to accidents at permanent parks.9
California leads the nation in amusement park fatalities, with sixteen over the past
twenty-eight years.10 Assemblyman Tom Torlakson introduced the bill that later
became Chapter 585 to curb this alarming trend." However, the proposed
legislation received additional immediacy when two more accidents occurred over
the summer, just as the bill was being debated.12 This new law promises to reduce
the number of injuries at permanent amusement park rides and brings California in
line with other states which already regulate this industry.'3
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Regulation of permanent amusement parks has been left largely to the states.' 4
California was among the first states in the country to pass amusement park safety
legislation.15 The 1968 Amusement Park Safety Law gave authority to Cal-OSHA
to inspect traveling carnival rides, but specifically excluded regulation of permanent
8. Id.
9. See id. (observing that while the total number of injuries rose from approximately 7,400 to 9,200 over
the five-year period from 1994 to 1998, "injuries on rides at mobile sites increased just slightly, from 2,000 to
2,100').
10. Legislator Announces Amusement Park Bill, L.A.TIMEs, Feb. 24. 1999, at B4. New Jersey is second
to California in the number of deaths from amusement rides, with six such deaths. Safety Law History Outlined
in Research Bureau Report, NEWSWIRES, Jan. 22, 1999.
11. See LegislatorAnnounces Amusement Park Bill, supra note 10, at B4 (quoting Assemblymember Tom
Torlakson, the author of AB 850, as saying "[w]e can make a difference that will avoid future tragedies and
deaths").
12. See Doug Willis, Bill Requiring Safety Inspections Advances, NEWSwREs, Sept. 3, 1999 (discussing
the death of a 12-year-old disabled boy who fell from the Drop Zone Stunt Tower at Paramount's Great America
in Santa Clara on August 22, 1999, and an accident at Six Flags Marine World in Vallejo, where 28 passengers
were stranded on a roller coaster for nearly four hours on August 25, 1999, just as the California Legislature was
debating the bill that later became Chapter 585).
13. CAL LAB. CODE §§ 7920-7932 (enacted by Chapter 585); see ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, COMMrrrE ANALYSiS OF AB 850, at 6 (Sept. 7, 1999) (stating that prior to the enactment of
Chapter 585, California was one of four states that regulated only mobile amusement rides).
14. See Susan J. Reiss, Amusement Park Safety: Who Should Regulate?, 5 CARDOzO ART& ENT. LJ. 195,
196 (1986) (describing how the 1981 amendments to the Consumer Product Safety Act exempted permanent
amusement rides and ended the controversy over whether the Act gave regulatory power over amusement park
rides to the federal government).
15. See Safety Law History Outlined in Research Bureau Report, supra note 10 (outlining the development
of amusement park safety legislation in the United States).
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rides. 16 While most states enacted permanent amusement park regulation,7 repeated
attempts at removing the exemption failed in California.'
While other states, such as New Jersey, required independent annual
inspections and disclosure of records of previous injuries, prior to Chapter 585,
California did not.' 9 In California, injury records were kept confidential.20 Not only
did the public lack information on parks' safety records, but logbooks documenting
previous injuries were sometimes difficult to obtain even through discovery in a
lawsuit.2' As a result, the public has demanded greater disclosure of potential
problems.22
I. CHAPTER 585
Chapter 585 provides a comprehensive approach subjecting amusement parks
with permanent amusement rides to the authority of Cal-OSHA.23 The program
provides for annual certificates of compliance24 to be issued by a qualified safety
16. CAL. LAB. CODE § 7901(West 1989).
17. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-133(1) (West 1990) (regulating any "place where one or more
mechanical rides or devices [is] capable of accommodating five or more persons . . . for amusement or
entertainment purposes"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 407(a)(1) (West 1995) (requiring inspections of permanent
"amusement park rides"); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 870-b(l) (McKinney 1988) (including "amusement parks" in a
permanent location).
18. See Hill-Holtzman, supra note 3, at BI (detailing three decades of unsuccessful attempts to regulate
permanent amusement park rides).
19. Compare, eg., NJ. STAT. ANN. T. 5, Ch. 3, Art. 6 (West 1996) (regulating carnivals and amusement
rides in New Jersey), with Schoch & Weber, supra note 2, at A3 (comparing regulation of amusement parks in
California with that of other states).
20. Schoch & Weber, supra note 2, at A3.
21. Cf. e.g., Teichert, supra note 3, at Al (explaining how Disneyland was sanctioned $7,050 for initially
withholding logbooks documenting prior complaints by a woman claiming brain injuries from the Indiana Jones
Adventure ride).
22. See, e.g., iL (quoting a mother of a child who had his foot half amputated by an amusement ride as
calling for greater disclosure and accountability, stating that while amusement parks have "hidden the danger[,]
... they owe it to [the public] to tell the truth").
23. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 7920-7932 (enacted by Chapter 585) (providing for thorough regulation of
permanent amusement rides, including; qualifications for qualified inspectors, annual certificates of compliance,
notification and maintenance of accurate records, a random inspection program, curbs on unsafe patron behavior,
minimum insurance coverage, penalties for intentional non-compliance, and partial self maintenance); id.
§ 7921(a) (enacted by Chapter 585) (defining a "permanent amusement ride" as "a mechanical device, aquatic
device, or combination of devices, of a permanent nature that carries or conveys passengers along, around, or over
a fixed or restricted route or course for the purpose of giving its passengers amusement, pleasure, thrills, or
excitement"); iU. (giving Cal-OSHA the authority to determine which specific devices fall under the definition
of a "permanent amusement ride"); id. (including bungee jumping as among those activities considered to be a
permanent amusement ride, but excluding "slides, playground equipment, coin-operated devices or conveyances
that operate directly on the ground or on a surface or pavement directly on the ground").
24. See id. § 7924(a) (enacted by Chapter 585) (requiring the owner of the permanent amusement ride to
submit a certificate of compliance to Cal-OSHA).
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inspector,25 who may be employed either by the owner of the amusement park or
by a third party.26 The new law requires the park to immediately notify Cal-OSHA
of any accidents 27 and to maintain accurate records of such accidents for future
inspection.23 Chapter 585 also prohibits operation of an amusement park ride which
a qualified safety inspector has found to be unsafe. 29 Moreover, to ensure that ride
equipment is properly operated, the new law mandates training of park employees.3
Furthermore, the new legislation prevents parks from operating unless a
minimum level of liability insurance covers the use of rides.3' Civil penalties of
$25,000 to $70,000 will act as the teeth to take a bite out of any owner or operator
who intentionally violates the provisions of the program.3 2 The law grants Cal-
OSHA the authority necessary for fixing and collecting reasonable fees to raise
funds 33 and to adopt any other rules and regulations necessary to administer the
program.34 However, Chapter 585 does not apply to permanent amusement parks
that are located within a county which had adopted the provisions of the Uniform
Building Code5 prior to April 1, 1998.36
25. 1d. § 7921(c) (enacted by Chapter 585); see id. (defining the term "qualified safety inspector" as either
(1) a licensed professional engineer, or (2) a person with a minimum of five years' experience in the amusement
park field, at least two of which involved the actual inspection of amusement rides, who has completed at least
80 hours of formal education in the last five years and complied with a 15-hour-per-year continuing education
requiremer.
26. Id. § 7924(e) (enacted by Chapter 535).
27. Id. § 7925(a) (enacted by Chapter 535).
28. Id. § 7924(t) (enacted by Chapter 585).
29. See id. § 7924(d) (enacted by Chapter 585) (mandating that amusement park operators make the
necessary repairs to any unsafe ride prior to resuming operation of the ride).
30. Id. § 7927 (enacted by Chapter 585).
31. See id. § 7926(a) (enacted by Chapter 585) (requiring that park owners carry a liability policy of
insurance with a minimum face value of $1,000,000 per occurrence, post an equivalent bond, or meet a financial
test of self-insurance, in case of injury or death resulting from a park ride).
32. Id. § 7930 (enacted by Chapter 585).
33. Id. § 7929 (enacted by Chapter 585); see id. (using the fees charged for the division's services to run
the program and fixing the fees as a percentage attributable to the expense of the program's administration).
34. Id. § 7928 (enacted by Chapter 585).
35. CAL HEALTH AND SAFEY CODE § 9507 (West Supp. 2000).
36. CAL LAB. CODE § 7932(a) (enacted by Chapter 585) (exempting permanent amusement rides from
provisions of Chapter 585 contingent upon a Cal-OSHA determination that these inspections meet or exceed the
standards of Chapter 585); see also Daniel M. Weintraub, Davis to OK Oversight Bill for Fun Parks Amusement,
ORANGE CouNTY REG., Sept. 11, 1999, at A10 (reporting that Universal Studios and Magic Mountain in Los
Angeles County will be exempt because that county's inspection program has been state certified to meet or
exceed the new standards).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LAW
Amusement park accidents which cause injuries to people are rare by any
standard.37 Because injuries are so rare, news of such occurrences draws sensational
coverage.38 Injuries which do occur are frequently the result of risky behavior by
the riders.39 However, members of the public do want to know that such incidents
will not happen to them or members of their families.' The public wants
reassurance that the government will hold the industry accountable for preventing
accidents. Chapter 585 was drafted in response to these concerns'
The history of amusement park laws shows that since 1945, legislators have
recognized amusement ride safety as a serious concern. 42 The only reason that
California law previously had not drawn amusement parks within its sphere is that
the industry had ameliorated state lawmakers' concerns by promulgating an internal
safety system.43 However, when that system's flaws were revealed, the credibility
of the industry's assurances as to the system's reliability was strained, and calls for
regulation resumed.e In a poll conducted in Orange County, California, prior to the
passage of Chapter 585, a majority of those polled favored regulation of amusement
parks.45 However, they voted in this way not because they thought amusement parks
were unsafe, but because they perceived inspections done by an independent third
party to be more trustworthy.46
Chapter 585 promises to provide accountability, which may give permanent
amusement parks added incentive to prevent injuries. It provides for much-needed
disclosure of injury records.47 Moreover, inspections by an independent third party
should serve to reassure the public. 8
37. See Jerry Hirsch, California Leads the Nation in Amusement-Park Ride Deaths, ORANGE COUNTY
REG., Jan. 13, 1999, at A01 (characterizing a visit to an amusement park as a "fairly safe activity" with a
"relatively low" risk of death).
38. See Noah Isackson, Committee OKs Bill Aiming for State Oversight over Amusement Parks,
NEWSWIRES, May 12, 1999 (disclosing that there has been an "increased public awareness about amusement park
accidents').
39. Hirsch, supra note 37, at A01.
40. See Editorial, Marine World's Woes, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 27, 1999, at A24 (noting the reluctance of
parents in "letting their sons and daughters partake in these thrill-seeking rides").
41. See Willis, supra note 12 (quoting the author of Chapter 585 as saying that the passage of the new law
"is a major step forward for consumers and for the safety of families, [as it] make[s] sure that parks are meeting
the state-of-the-art best standards").
42. See generally Safety Law History Outlined in Research Bureau Report, supra note 15 (citing a 1997
historical study by the California Research Bureau).
43. I.
44. Id.; Schoch &Weber, supra note 2, atB1 (discussing increased interest in safety after a fatal Christmas
Eve accident at Disneyland).
45. E. Scott Reckard, -unes Orange County Poll, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7,1999, at Al.
46. See, e.g., id. (quoting one Orange County resident as stating, "I think Disneyland and Knott's Berry
Farm are safe places[,] ... [blut how reasonable is it to have them monitor themselves?').
47. CAL. LAB. CODE § 7924(0 (enacted by Chapter 585).
48. Schoch & Weber, supra note 2, at A3.
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The amusement park industry and its representatives in the Legislature have
their own concerns. 49 They argue that the burden that Chapter 585 imposes on the
industry is notjustified, noting that the risk of harm posed by amusement park rides
is low relative to other human activities. 0 In other words, the public should accept
the few deaths and serious injuries which occur as a cost of doing business.5'
Another consideration is a possible impact on the prices of tickets at permanent
amusement parks.52 The annual cost of running the program that Chapter 585
envisions is estimated at between $169,000 and $283,000.5 3 This cost will be passed
on to the parks through fees collected by Cal-OSHA. 4 Moreover, the parks will
have to spend money to comply with the program's provisions. 55 The increased cost
of operation to parks is equivalent to a tax which may be passed on to consumers
through higher ticket prices.56
V. CONCLUSION
The public has indicated through recent legislation that it will not accept deaths
and serious injuries at amusement parks as a cost of doing business.57 The rash of
recent accidents has served to make people skeptical that permanent amusement
parks are doing all they can to provide for the safety of their visitors." Chapter 585
addresses these concerns by creating a comprehensive system which provides
reliable evidence that measures are being taken to assure public safety.59 Although
49. See Willis, supra note 12 (repeating the concerns of Senator Ray Haynes that the bill increases
government bureaucracy without increasing safely); id. (stating that Chapter 585 assumes "that someone who has
invested millions and millions of dollars in a ride will do a less effective job (inspecting it) than a state inspector
who gets paid whether he does his job or not.. .'). But see Matthew Yi & Marsha Ginsburg, Carnivals Got Safer
in 1972; Recent Accidents May Bring Regulation to Amusement Parks, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 27, 1999, at A19
(quoting Dana Babin) (acknowledging that while the parks are under "pressure to be open and presentable," safety
could be subject to discretion in a self-regulated park).
50. See Hirsch, supra note 37, at A01 (estimating that permanent amusement park ride accidents account
for about 4,600 people injured annually, only four percent of whom are hospitalized); id. (comparing the low rate
of permanent amusement park accidents with those of playground and traffic accidents, accounting for 200,000
injuries and 20 deaths per year for the former and 115,000 deaths from 1973 to 1997 for the latter).
51. Willis, supra note 12.
52. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMrIrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 850, at 6 (Sept.
7, 1999).
53. Id.
54. See CAL LAB. CODE § 7929 (enacted by Chapter 585) (providing for collection of fees for running the
program).
55. See id. (allowing Cal-OSHA to collect reasonable fees from parks to raise funds).
56. See ARMmEA.ALCHAIN&WLIAMR.Au.EN,EXCHANGEANDPRODUCriON 64-66(1983) (explalning
that taxes on suppliers operating by the market-pricing system will cause a portion of the funds raised by that tax
to be "borne by the consumer[s] at the higher price") (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
57. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 7920-7932 (enacted by Chapter 585).
58. See Reckard, supra note 45, at Al (revealing that the calls for increased regulation were based on a
lack of trust of the industry to regulate itself).
59. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 7920-7932 (enacted by Chapter 585).
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the risk of accidents at permanent amusement parks is low,6 the sheer magnitude
of people susceptible to this risk justifies the regulation.1
60. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
61. See Mary Katches, Disney's Clout in Politics Evident in Legislation, ORANGE COUNTY REG., May 9,
1999, at A01(disclosing that "500 million patrons go to amusement parks each year").

